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An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice Practitioners: Aggravation, Mitigation, and Admission
Defenses
Lieutenant Colonel Eric R. Carpenter
Introduction
What themes drive a juror's decision to vote for life or
death in a capital case? For a judge advocate assigned to a
capital case, the answer to that question should serve as the
foundation for her case development. If she builds a case
based on what attorneys traditionally think is aggravating
and mitigating, she might build the wrong case. What is
important is what jurors actually think, and then
constructing arguments to match those belief patterns.
Fortunately, modem research provides insight on what
influences jurors to vote for life or for death. Jurors tend to
focus on three aggravating themes: fear, loathing, and lack
of remorse.' Jurors also tend to find a few mitigating themes
persuasive: residual doubt, shared culpability, reduced
culpability, family testimony, and remorse. 2
Even if the judge advocate gets the theme right, if she
waits too long to present the evidence that supports that
theme, she may have missed her chance to influence the
panel members. Modem research has also shown that jurors
make up their minds early about the appropriate penalty in
the case. Although jurors are supposed to wait until the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing before deliberating and
then deciding on punishment, research has shown that one-
half ofjurors choose the punishment for the crime during the
presentation of evidence on the merits and during merits
deliberation.3  Almost all of these jurors were absolutely
convinced or pretty certain of their decision, and six in ten
of these jurors held fast to that belief through the sentencing
phase.s
Further, even though jurors are prohibited from
discussing the sentence until all the evidence is presented
. Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Curently assigned as Chair and Professor, Criminal
Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School,
U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. This article is part two of an article
published in the May 2011, The Army Lawyer by Lieutenant Colonel Eric
R. Carpenter, An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice
Practitioners: Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and Juror Responsibility.
' See infra notes 18-26.
2 See infra notes 38-44.
3 William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview ofEarly Findings, 70 IND. L.J 1043, 1089-90 (1995).
4 Id. at 1089-90; Maria Sandys, Cross Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change
Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing
Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1191-95 (1995).
s William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Juror's Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476, 1491-92 (1998).
during the penalty phase, jurors talk about their positions
well before then: "Three to four of every ten jurors (33.6%
to 45.7%) indicated [their preference] during guilt
deliberations."6 More importantly, some jurors start actively
and explicitly negotiating the death penalty vote during the
merits deliberations:
For some jurors, guilt deliberations
became the place for negotiating or for
forcing a trade off between guilt and
punishment. One or more jurors with some
doubts, possibly reasonable doubts, about
a capital murder verdict nevertheless may
have agreed to vote guilty of capital
murder in exchange for an agreement with
pro-death jurors to abandon the death
penalty.7
The critical lesson is that if an attorney waits until the
penalty phase to present certain evidence, then that attorney
may be too late.
These findings are among many uncovered by the
Capital Jury Project (CJP).8 Started in 1991, the CJP is a
research project supported by the National Science
Foundation and headquartered at the University of Albany's
School of Criminal Justice.9 The CJP is comprised of "a
consortium of university-based investigators-chiefly
criminologists, social psychologists, and law faculty
members-utilizing common data-gathering instruments and
procedures."o
The CJP investigators conduct in-depth interviews with
people who have served on juries in capital cases "randomly
selected from a random sample of cases, half of which
resulted in a final verdict of death, and half of which resulted
6 Id. at 1519.
7 Id. at 1527; Sandys, supra note 4.
8 For an excellent introduction to the Capital Jury Project (CJP) findings
along with a list of articles and books related to the CJP, see SCoTT E.
SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
PENALTY (2005). Sundby introduces the broad themes of the CJP within
the study of a single jury. See also SCH. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UNIV. AT
ALBANY, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y., Publications, http://www.albany.edu/scj/
13194.php (last visited June 8, 2011); CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., Articles
cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-project/Articles.project/Articles.cfm (last
visited June 7, 2011) (providing lists of articles and book related to the
CJP).
9 STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIM. JUST., What is the
Capital Jury Project?, http://www.albany.edulscj/CJPwhat.htm (last visited
May 15, 2011) [hereinafter, What is the CJP?].
1o Bowers, supra note 3, at 1043.
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in a final verdict of life imprisonment."" Trained
interviewers administer a fifty-one page survey and then
conduct a three to four hour interview.' 2  The interviews
"chronicle the jurors' experiences and decision-making over
the course of the trial, identify points at which various
influences come into play, and reveal the ways in which
jurors reach their final sentencing decisions."' 3 To support
their findings, the researchers draw upon the statistical data
that results from the surveys and interviews as well as the
narrative accounts given by the jurors.14 So far, the CJP has
conducted interviews with 1198 jurors from 353 capital
trials in 14 states.'5
The CJP's findings related to aggravation, mitigation,
and to when jurors make their decisions have important
implications for theme development. We will see that jurors
approach aggravation and mitigation based on certain
fundamental beliefs about human behavior (free will versus
environmental shaping) and punishment (eye-for-an-eye
versus redemption). Counsel should shape the aggravating
and mitigating evidence to address those beliefs.
The findings are also important because they validate an
important defense strategy known as the admission
defense.' 6  Admission defenses "admit that the defendant
committed the acts charged, but also assert that she lacked
the requisite intent to be held criminally liable for the
offense charged. Provocation, self-defense, insanity,
diminished capacity, and lack of specific intent are all
examples of admission defenses."' We will see that if a
defense counsel uses an admission defense, she will address
many of the issues related to theme development. The
admission defense helps jurors focus on two key mitigators:
reduced culpability and lingering doubt. The admission
defense allows the accused to accept some responsibility for
the crime and appear remorseful. Importantly, the admission
defense addresses the timing of juror decision-making by
ensuring that the jurors know about some of the mitigating
evidence before they might become foreclosed to it. With an
" John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND
REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 147 (Stephen P. Garvey ed.,
2003).
I2 Id.
13 What is the C/P?, supra note 9.
14 Id. For an in-depth discussion of the sampling design and data collection
methods, see Bowers, supra note 3, at 1077-84.
1s What is the CJP?, supra note 9.
16 Scott E. Sundby, The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the
Death Penalty, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1584 (1998).
" Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983). See generally John H.
Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1035, 1039 (2008).
admission defense, the jurors learn about the mitigating
evidence in the merits phase of trial. By using the admission
defense, defense counsel can approach the merits phase and
the sentencing phase as one, or what John Blume calls the
integration of the guilt and penalty phase stories. 8  The
admission defense allows for a consistent, integrated, and
comprehensive defense case that spans both the guilt and
penalty phases.
Military attorneys may have heard of a defense counsel
strategy in capital cases called "frontloading mitigation." 9
However, "frontloading mitigation" is not the actual trial
strategy. The trial strategy is the admission defense. One of
the benefits of an admission defense is that it allows the
defense counsel to introduce mitigating evidence during the
merits phase of the trial. We will see that simply
frontloading mitigating factors into the merits phase without
then tying the evidence back to a broader defense
explanation on why the accused committed the offense-an
explanation that spans the guilt and penalty phases-may
not be effective.
This article will cover these themes in aggravation and
mitigation and will discuss the underlying juror beliefs that
drive those themes. Throughout, the article will explore how
counsel on both sides of a capital case can use these findings
to improve their trial practice but will pay special attention
to how admission defenses address these themes. Finally,
the article will conclude by looking at how some of the
lessons learned from the CJP research can be applied to non-
capital cases.
Aggravation Themes
The CJP research shows that jurors make the death
penalty decision based on three main aggravating
circumstances: fear, loathing, and lack of remorse.
Fear is the degree to which the defendant poses a risk of
future danger if he were to be released from prison. In close
cases, jurors err on the side of public safety: jurors would
' Blume et al., supra note 17, at 1043.
19 The Army Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that frontloading
mitigation evidence into the merits case is a legitimate trial tactic. United
States v. Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773, 781 n.9 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
20 See Blume et al., supra note 11, at 162; Blume, supra note 17, at 1046-50
(using the terms, "vileness," "future dangerousness" and "lack of remorse");
SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 31. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, The
Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000)
[hereinafter Garvey, Emotional Economy]; Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1538 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation]. These
aggravating circumstances may or may not be the same as the legal
aggravating factors that a jurisdiction uses to limit the arbitrary application
of the death penalty.
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rather have the defendant's blood on their hands than the
blood of a future victim. Interestingly, jurors are not just
concerned about the safety of the public, but their own
personal safety. Jurors express fear that the defendant might
somehow get out of jail after conviction, either through
parole or escape, and come after them.2' Evidence related to
future dangerousness includes the facts surrounding the
apprehension (i.e., Did the defendant submit peacefully to
law enforcement or violently resist?), escape attempts, and
how the defendant has adjusted to incarceration (i.e., Has he
followed the rules or has he committed disciplinary
violations?).22
Loathing is how much the jurors hate the defendant for
the crime he has committed or are otherwise disgusted by
him. Jurors were more likely to vote for death when the
killing was brutal (involving torture or physical abuse), was
bloody or gory, or when the defendant mutilated the dead
body.23 If the victim was a child, jurors found this to be a
highly aggravating factor. If the victim was a woman or had
high social standing, jurors found this to be a somewhat
aggravating factor.24
Lack of remorse in this context does not mean that a
defendant has failed to say he is sorry for what he has done.
Jurors do not make their decisions based on whether the
defendant gets up in court and says he is sorry-first,
because it rarely happens (particularly when the defendant is
claiming factual innocence) and second, because jurors do
not believe the defendant when he does make an in-court
apology.25 Rather, jurors look to the moment of the crime
and the period immediately following the crime for
indications of a lack of remorse-factors such as whether the
defendant shouted obscenities at the victim as he killed her,
or bragged about it to his friends.26 The more cold-blooded
and vicious the crime, the less likely jurors are to believe
that the defendant is remorseful, 27 believing the brutality of
21 SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 36. See generally John H. Blume et al., Future
Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV.
397 (2001).
22 Positive prison behavior is referred to as Skipper evidence. In Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986), the Court held that a capital
defendant's right to present mitigating evidence includes evidence of
positive prison behavior.
23 Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 20, at 1555-56.
24 Id. Some of this data was collected before the Supreme Court explicitly
allowed victim impact evidence to be introduced at trial. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). See also Garvey, Emotional Economy,
supra note 20, at 46-50.
25 Sundby, supra note 16, at 1568-69. If a military accused takes the stand,
a military prosecutor may comment on the accused's lack of remorse if
certain conditions are met. United States v. Edwards, 35 M.J. 351 (C.M.A.
1992); United States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
26 Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 20, at 1561.
27 Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in
Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1609-15 (1998).
the crime shows the defendant's lack of remorse. Jurors do
give credit to expressions of remorse that are not associated
with the trial, such as statements made and actions taken
when the defendant did not have a self-serving reason to
make them.28
Jurors further assess remorse based on whether the
defendant has accepted responsibility for the crime and has
owned up to his actions.29 If the defendant denies
involvement in the crime, the jurors may perceive that the
defendant is saying to everyone, "Oh, yeah? Prove it," and
therefore is unremorseful. As Scott Sundby explains, "[A]
death penalty trial is no ordinary criminal trial and invoking
one's presumption of innocence can prove deadly."30 And
when the evidence shows that the defendant did commit the
crime, the defense loses credibility and looks hypocritical
and inconsistent in the penalty phase, particularly when the
defense then presents mitigation evidence to explain why the
defendant may have done the crime that he earlier denied
committing.3
Presenting an admission defense does not involve those
inconsistencies. Under an admission defense, the defendant
is not saying he did not do the underlying act; rather, he is
saying he is not as culpable as the government is trying to
portray him to be.32 With an admission defense, the
defendant accepts some responsibility for the underlying
crime; the jurors perceive the defendant as remorseful; and
the jurors are therefore more likely to vote for life instead of
the death penalty.
Further, the CJP research shows that the more a crime
looks like it was driven by the circumstances that surrounded
the defendant--circumstances that suggest accident or
mistake, self-defense, provocation, lack of intent, or mental
illness-the jurors are more likely to find remorse. Note
that these circumstances describe the different types of
admission defenses.
28 Sundby, supra note 16, at 1586.
2 9 Id. at 1573-74.
30 SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 33.
" Id. at 33-35.
32 Granted, some defendants will not want to pursue any admission
defenses, either because he did not do the crime, or, when faced with two
unpleasant options-life without parole or death-he would rather pursue
the chance of an acquittal, however small.
3 Eisenberg et al, supra note 27, at 1609-15.
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Jurors also assess remorse by looking at the defendant's
relationship with his family: "Jurors perhaps think that
defendants who are capable of showing love to their families
also have the capacity to experience remorse."3 4 This type
of evidence includes how the defendant has helped-or
hurt-the lives of the people around him who were not the
direct victims of the crime.
Further, jurors look to in-court demeanor to decide
whether the defendant is remorseful. Jurors often pay more
attention to the defendant's demeanor than they do to the
evidence being presented. Jurors described that when the
defendant looked clean-cut in court, he seemed to be trying
to manipulate them, particularly when they compare that
clean-cut image to the street image captured in his post-
arrest mug shot. 3 6 If the defendant appears nonchalant or
arrogant or tries to smile at or make eye contact with jurors,
the jurors regard that as showing no remorse. Jurors
expect the defendant to show emotion at the emotionally
tense portions of the trial; if the defendant does not, jurors
believe he has no remorse. 38
Generally, military prosecutors may not comment on the
accused's in-court demeanor unless certain rigorous
conditions are met.39 However, the panel members will
likely determine whether the accused is remorseful based on
the accused's in-court demeanor, regardless of whether the
attorneys comment on it. The panel members' reliance on
in-court demeanor may present a serious challenge to the
defense counsel representing an accused who has a mental
condition that causes him to have a restricted or flat affect,
or who has low intelligence and so might not have a full
grasp of the complex issues going on around him. Military
defense counsel need to find a way to inform the jurors that
the accused looks the way he does because of his illness or
impairment and not due to a lack of remorse. The defense
counsel can do this through the testimony of a mental health
professional, or by asking for an instruction.
These major themes-fear, loathing, and lack of
remorse-push jurors toward choosing the death penalty.
Prosecutors should focus their evidence on these themes and
defense counsel should work to rebut them. Defense
counsel should also work to affirmatively present mitigating
evidence to support themes that are important to jurors. We
turn to those now.
" Id. at 1621.
35 Id.
36 SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 31.
" Id. at 32.
38 Id.; Sundby, supra note 16, at 1561-64.
3 United States v. Edwards, 35 M.J. 351, 354-56 (C.M.A. 1992); United
States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484, 487-88 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
Mitigation Themes
The CJP's findings related to mitigation are
extraordinary because most of the factors that attorneys
think of as mitigating turn out not to be very mitigating.
Shown below is a table40 of classically mitigating factors
detailing the percentage of jurors who do not think that
factor is mitigating:
Percentages of Jurors Who Do Not See Classically
Mitigating Factors as Mitigating
Defendant Was a Drug Addict 90.3%
Defendant Was an Alcoholic 86.3%
Defendant Had a Background of Extreme Poverty 85.0%
Defendant's Accomplice Received Lesser 82.9%
Punishment in Exchange for Testimony
Defendant Had No Previous Criminal Record 80.0%
Defendant Would be a Well-Behaved Inmate 73.8%
Defendant Had Been Seriously Abused as a Child 63.0%
Defendant Was Under 18 at the Time of the Crime 58.5%
Defendant Had Been in Institutions But Was Never 51.8%
Given Any Real Help
Defendant Had a History of Mental Illness 43.9%
Defendant Was Mentally Retarded 26.2%
A defense counsel might think that she has a great case
in mitigation because her client was a drug-addicted
alcoholic who grew up in the projects and whose buddy in
the same killing got a life sentence, but this chart suggests
that many jurors would not agree. Defense counsel should
still investigate and pursue this type of evidence, but these
statistics suggest that this evidence standing alone may not
be persuasive to many jurors or panel members.
Note that while most jurors think mental illness and
mental retardation are mitigating factors, a significant
minority think these impairments are not. This significant
minority may think that this impairment makes the
defendant an even greater danger to the public if he were
ever released.4 1
While the CJP has shown that many jurors do not find
the classically mitigating factors to be very mitigating,42 the
40 This table is taken directly from John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life
Qualication" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209,
1229 (2001).
41 Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLOM. L. REV. 291, 299 (1989);
see generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
405 (1966).
42 The findings reflected in this table are important for other reasons as well.
Potential jurors cannot be "mitigation impaired"; they must still be able to
consider mitigating evidence. Blume et al., supra note 40, at 1229; see also
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). Counsel can ask panel members
questions during voir dire to determine if the panel members are mitigation
impaired.
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CJP has shown that jurors do find certain mitigating factors
43to be persuasive. The best mitigating factor is residual or
lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt, defined as doubt
about the defendant's factual guilt or legal guilt." For
example, a juror might not have any doubt that the defendant
committed the crime (factual guilt), but might have lingering
doubts about whether the defendant had the full intent
required for the capital offense (legal guilt).
Another proven mitigating factor is shared culpability.
Under shared culpability, the defendant is blameworthy for
the crime, but someone else also has unclean hands. The
victim can share culpability based on his role in the crime
(e.g., a drug dealer killed in a deal gone bad). Society can
share blame because someone in an official position might
have been able to prevent the crime but failed to act on
signals or failed to give the defendant help when he sought it
out before the crime.
Further, reduced culpability is also a mitigating factor.
Reduced culpability arises when an impairment or
circumstance out of the defendant's control is a significant
reason why the crime occurred, such as mental health
problems or diminished intelligence that may not rise to the
level of a defense or provide an exclusion from the death
penalty. Here, mental illness and mental retardation are
mitigating factors not simply because the defendant suffers
from one or the other, but because the impairment played a
direct role in the crime. Note again that admission
The CJP has influenced one of the major revolutions in capital trial
work: the development of the Colorado voir dire method. One of the CJP
findings is that most juries start deliberations with at least some jurors who
support a life sentence. Bowers et al., supra note 3, at 1491-96; Sandys,
supra note 4. David Wymore recognized that the key for defense counsel
was to find a way to preserve those potential votes. Videotape: Selecting a
Colorado Jury-One Vote for Life (Wild Berry Prods. 2004), available at
http://www.thelifepenalty.com. Called the Colorado voir dire method
(Wymore was practicing in Colorado when he developed this method), the
method has two basic parts. The first part is designed to get jurors to
accurately express their views on capital punishment and mitigation in order
for the defense to rationally exercise their peremptory challenges and to
build grounds for challenges for cause. The second part is designed to
address jury dynamics. See Lieutenant Colonel Eric R. Carpenter, An
Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice Practitioners:
Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and Juror Responsibility, ARMY LAW.,
May 2011, at 6. The method is grounded in constitutional law. See Blume
et al., supra note 40.
For the military defense counsel who is detailed to a capital case,
training in the Colorado method is the most important capital-specific
training to receive. The method is generally taught over a three or four day
hands-on seminar. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
generally offers one training seminar on the Colorado Method every year.
See http://www.nacdl.org. One of these seminars has been captured on
video and is available for training. Videotape: Selecting a Colorado Jury-
One Vote for Life (Wild Berry Productions 2004), available at
http://www.thelifepenalty.com. See generally Richard S. Jaffe, Capital
Cases: Ten Principles for Individualized Voir Dire on the Death Penalty,
THE CHAMPION, Jan. 2001, at 35; Blume et al, supra note 17, at 1039.
4 Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 20, at 1561-67.
4 Sundby, supra note 16, at 1585.
defenses-accident or mistake, self-defense, provocation,
lack of intent, or mental illness-all work to reduce the
accused's culpability.
Testimony from family members is also mitigating for
several reasons. One reason, as shown above, is that the
testimony can help jurors assess remorse. Another reason is
that jurors find the impact of a possible execution on the
defendant's family members to be mitigating. Further,
testimony from a family member might be the only evidence
by which jurors can conclude that the defendant "might have
some good in him as well as evil.'AS This combination of
mitigating effects leads to "the dark humor saying of capital
defense attorneys that . . learning that the defendant has a
mother reduces the chances of a death sentence by half.""
The Relationship Between Aggravation, Mitigation, and
Juror Belief Systems
By looking at both aggravating and mitigating factors,
we can see that in capital cases certain fundamental beliefs
about human nature and punishment regularly come into
conflict: free will versus environment, and an-eye-for-an-eye
versus redemption. When we view the findings on
aggravation and mitigation through these belief lenses, we
can make some sense of why some circumstances are
aggravating and some are mitigating-and find ways to
develop cases to properly address those beliefs.
The first conflict is between the belief that the defendant
is solely responsible for committing the crime through the
exercise of free will, and the belief that people are complex
and can be shaped by their environments in ways they
cannot control. Jurors tend to view tales of hardship as
running counter to their understanding of free will. Even if
an offender came from a life of extreme hardship, many
jurors will conclude, "Okay, but he still had a choice, and he
chose to do this crime." This type of mitigation is viewed as
a sneaky excuse: "There he goes again, placing blame on
everyone but himself."A7 These jurors "very much shared
the belief that individuals control their own destiny and
generally should be seen as capable of making their own
choices even under adverse circumstances."" This runs
counter to the belief that people are shaped by their
environment. Jurors who are influenced by this belief see
people as "human supercolliders, their personalities buffeted
and shaped in unseen ways by the numerous events, people,
and influences that they come in contact with.""
45 SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 46.
4 Id. at 47.
47 Id. at 35.
48 Id. at 43.
49Id. at 70.
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The second conflict of beliefs is between the axiom
belief in an-eye-for-an-eye ("[Y]ou take somebody's life,
you pay with yours")50 versus the belief in "the power of
redemption and [the] essential hope that people could
become better."5' These beliefs are often deeply rooted in
the juror's religious tradition. The eye-for-an-eye beliefs are
generally found in the Old Testament, to include, "Anyone
who strikes a person with a fatal blow is to be put to
death,"S2 or, "Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall
their blood be shed,"53 or, "If anyone strikes someone a fatal
blow with an iron object, that person is a murderer; the
murderer is to be put to death."S4 However, the New
Testament contains passages that call for forgiveness and
acknowledge the power of redemption. The author of John
describes how Jesus came upon a crowd that had caught a
woman who had committed adultery and were preparing to
stone her according to the laws described above. 5 Jesus
said, "Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to
throw a stone at her."56 The crowd began to dissipate until
only Jesus was standing with the woman. Jesus then told
her he did not condemn her and told her to live the rest of
her life without sin.s These are two sets of powerful and
deeply-rooted belief systems that jurors will rely upon when
making one of the most significant decisions of their lives-
the decision to sentence someone to death or to life in
prison.
With this understanding of juror belief systems, we can
make some sense of the surprising findings about classically
mitigating factors. We saw that evidence of a life of abuse,
standing alone, does not help much. We can call this
"freestanding mitigation." This mitigation does not explain
why the accused did what he did, or address any of the
underlying beliefs. Rather, defense counsel need to go
beyond the fact that something bad happened to the accused
in order to reach the juror's underlying beliefs. If the
underlying belief is that a person acts according to his own
free will, then the mitigation evidence needs to show that the
person was constrained in exercising free will in a way that
"o Id. at 17.
5' Id. at 73. For a detailed look at how religious themes impact death
penalty decisions, see John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Don't Take
His Eye, Don't Take His Tooth, and Don't Cast the First Stone: Limiting
Religious Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 61
(2000).
52 Exodus 21:12 (New International Version).
s3 Genesis 9:6 (New International Version).
54 Numbers 35:16 (New International Version).
ss John 8:3-5 (New International Version).
1 Id. at 8:7.
"Id. at 8:9.
Id. at 8:10-11.
regular people are not.59 The mitigation evidence also needs
to show that the accused was not in control of the situation.
We can call this "connected mitigation." As John Blume
puts it, "[T]he devil is in the details."60  Defense counsel
need to connect "a truly compelling case of [a mitigating
factor] tied to events in the defendant's life and its role in
the crime."6' When the impairment or condition is directly
related to the commission of this crime, then jurors can
reconcile the case before them with their deeply-held beliefs
about free will.
The military uses the words extenuation and mitigation.
Matters in extenuation are those things that "explain the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense,
including those reasons for committing the offense which do
not constitute a legal justification or excuse." 62 Matters in
mitigation are those things that "lessen the punishment to be
adjudged by the court-martial."63  From our discussion
above, we can see that extenuation is really just a subset of
mitigation: extenuating matters are those that show why the
accused committed the crime and therefore will mitigate or
lessen the punishment. Extenuation is connected mitigation
and therefore more powerful.
For example, an accused may have grown up suffering
from severe abuse and neglect. With nothing more, that
would be freestanding mitigation. If, however, the attorney
does the work to show that because of the abuse and neglect,
the accused's brain development was interrupted or his brain
was otherwise damaged, then the attorney may be able to
show that the accused became hard-wired to respond to
certain situations with certain behavior. The attorney can
use that information to then argue that the abuse and neglect
explains why the accused behaved the way he did on this
s9 An interesting finding related to these conflicts in beliefs (and that is
contrary to the belief of many trial attorneys) is that jurors who personally
identify with the defendant (e.g., similar troubled background) generally
will not side with the defendant. SUNDBY, supra note 8, at 14. If the juror
came from that same background and overcame his circumstances to
succeed in life, then that juror will not be sympathetic to claims that the
defendant's background is mitigating: "If I could do it, then so could he."
Id. However, someone who recognizes that one of his family members is
like the defendant-a brother, son, or father-is more likely to be
sympathetic to these claims: "The reaction often is a shared sense of
helplessness with the defendant's family members who had tried so hard to
keep the defendant from slipping into a life of crime." Id. at 114. This
lesson is not limited to capital cases: prosecutors should try to keep jurors
who identify closely with the defendant, whereas defense counsel should try
to keep jurors who identify closely with the defendant's family members. A
counsel defending a drug addict does not necessarily want the reformed
drug addict to sit on the jury, but would want the mother of a drug addict on
a jury.
6 Blume et al., supra note 17, 1039.
Id. (emphasis added).
62 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1001(c)(1)(A)
(2008) [hereinafter MCMI.
63 Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(1)(B).
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certain occasion. The attorney will have converted
mitigation into extenuation.
Note again the power of the admission defense. By
using an admission defense (provocation, self-defense,
insanity, diminished capacity, lack of specific intent,
accident, or mistake), the defense counsel can connect the
mitigation directly to the commission of the crime.
Someone with impaired executive functioning, a mental
illness, very low intelligence, or who finds himself in a
precarious situation is limited in how he can exercise free
will in a way that a person with a normal brain, or average
mental health, or normal intelligence, or enough time and
space to think is not otherwise limited.
The defense counsel might argue for the lack of mental
responsibility defense, understanding those findings are
extremely rare because the accused has to have a severe
mental disease or defect, and that defect had to have caused
the accused to be unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or wrongfulness of his acts. 4 The defense counsel will not
likely get that finding, but by giving notice of the defense,65
presenting some evidence that tends to show the accused
lacked mental responsibility, 66 and then seeking the
instructions for the defense,6 7 the defense counsel forces the
panel to focus on and discuss the issue of the accused's
mental health in the context of why the crime was
committed. The key is to ensure that the mitigating factor is
not freestanding, but is instead connected directly to the
crime.
Other mitigation evidence must then supplement this by
addressing the eye-for-an-eye versus redemption conflict.
Defense counsel will have to address the eye-for-an-eye
belief by reducing the jury's perception of the accused's
vileness and dangerousness. Defense counsel must address
the panel members' fears that the accused might one day be
released from prison and be a potential future danger to
68
society. Defense counsel can mitigate the loathing
generated by the crime by showing that the victim or society
shared culpability. Defense counsel can also present
evidence that the accused is genuinely remorseful or has
accepted responsibility for his crimes. Defense counsel
will also need to introduce mitigation that works to increase
the accused's redemptive value. Defense counsel can do this
by showing the accused's genuine remorse and acceptance
6 UCMJ art. 50a(a) (2008); MCM, supra note 62, R.C.M. 916(k)(1).
65 MCM, supra note 62, R.C.M. (701)(b)(2).
66 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK para.
6-1 (1 Jan. 2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK].
61 Id. paras. 6-4, 6-7.
68 Carpenter, supra note 42, at 6.
69 See generally Blume et al., supra note 17, at 1046-50.
of responsibility and through the testimony of family
members, to include the impact that an execution would
have on them. Those themes-free will versus environment,
and an-eye-for-an-eye versus redemption-drive the jurors'
reasoning processes, and therefore counsel should address
them.
Admission Defenses and Residual Doubt
We have seen that an admission defense focuses the
jurors on reduced culpability (a known mitigator), and
allows the accused to appear remorseful (another known
mitigator) by allowing him to accept some responsibility for
his actions in the merits phase of the trial. Another benefit
of the admission defense is that it allows the defense counsel
to focus the panel on legitimate concerns about legal guilt,
thereby implicating the most compelling capital mitigator:
residual doubt.
For example, in a premeditated murder case, the defense
counsel might introduce mental health evidence, fully
knowing that in the end, every panel member will be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.
However, for the defense counsel, the real target is not
reasonable doubt, but lingering doubt. The defense counsel
is trying to take the certainty of legal guilt off of 100
percent, even if only to 99 or 98 percent.
In some cases, the accused might have believed that
what he was doing was right. First, note that the test for lack
of mental responsibility in the military is not "unable to
know the wrongfulness of the acts." The test is "unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the acts."7 0 There is a big
difference between know and appreciate. According to
Joshua Dressler, jurisdictions that choose know have adopted
a formalistic approach:
[T]he word "know" used . . . in the test
may be defined narrowly or broadly.
Some courts apply the word narrowly: a
person may be found sane if she can
describe what she was doing ("I was
strangling her") and can acknowledge the
forbidden nature of her conduct ("I knew I
was doing something wrong"). This may
be referred to as "formal cognitive
knowledge."7
Under this test, if an accused knows that the conduct is
against the law, then he will not satisfy the defense.
7o UCMJ art. 50a(a) (2008).
n JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 25.04(C)(1)(a), at
350-52 (5th ed. 2009).
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However, Congress and military appellate courts have
rejected this approach and instead have used the word
"appreciate." This other approach is called the "affective"
approach. According to Joshua Dressler:
Some courts, however, require a deeper
meaning of "knowledge" ("affective
knowledge"), which is absent unless the
actor can evaluate her conduct in terms of
its impact on others and appreciate the
total setting in which she acts ...
[S]uppose that D, due to mental illness,
believes that God has instructed her to kill
V, an act that D knows violates the secular
law. In view of God's edict, however, D
believes that it is morally right to kill V.
On these facts, D is sane if the right-and-
wrong test is based on awareness of the
illegality of an act; she should be found
not guilty by reason of insanity, however,
if [the test] requires knowledge of the
immorality of her actions. . . . American
law is sharply divided. In jurisdictions
that apply a "moral right-and-wrong"
standard, however, the issue is not whether
the defendant personally and subjectively
believed that her conduct was morally
proper; the question is whether she
knowingly violated societal standards of
morality. Therefore, D is sane under this
prong of [the test] if she commits an
offense that she knows society will
condemn, but which she is convinced is
morally proper ...
... [However, a] person who believes that
God had decreed her act is likely to
believe that society would approve of her
conduct.72
Military appellate courts, noting that Congress chose the
word "appreciate," have rejected the formalistic approach
and have adopted the affective approach. In United States v.
Martin," the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
discussed the meaning of "appreciate":
The word "appreciate" was chosen with
legislative care . . . The choice of the word
"appreciate," rather than "know" . . . is
significant; mere intellectual awareness
that conduct is wrongful, when divorced
from appreciation of the moral or legal
71 Id. (emphasis in original).
n 56 M.J. 97 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
import of behavior, can have little
significance ... This construct mirrors that
contained in the legislative history. While
Congress otherwise chose to adopt the
[M'Naghten rule], in this word choice,
Congress adopted the language of the
Model Penal Code rather than the
M'Naghten rule ("appreciate" vs. "know")
and thereby broadened the inquiry.
("Know" leads to an excessively narrow
focus on "a largely detached or abstract
awareness that does not penetrate to the
affective level.") 74
We see that the Martin court believed that "wrongful" means
more than just knowledge that the act was illegal. The
accused must be able to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
act.
The accused must be able to evaluate his conduct in
terms of its impact on others, appreciate the total setting in
which he acts, and understand the consequences of his acts:
"[A] defendant who is unable to appreciate the nature and
quality of his acts is one that does not have mens rea
because he cannot comprehend his crimes, including their
consequences."75  The court also stated, "Other federal
circuits recognize that a defendant's delusional belief that
his criminal conduct is morally or legally justified may
establish an insanity defense under federal law."76 The court
also offered this example: "He knew what he was doing, he
knew that he was crushing the skull of a human being with
an iron bar. However, because of mental disease, he did not
know that what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for
example, that he was carrying out a command from God.""
The accused might know that what he is doing is illegal
under the laws of man, but because of a severe mental
disease or defect, he might believe that God is telling him to
do the act or approves of the act and so may believe that the
act is morally right, and therefore be unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the act.
With that understanding of the meaning of the word
"appreciate," defense counsel can put on a case that might
cause some panel members to have some residual doubt
about the accused's legal guilt. For example, the accused is
a Muslim deployed to a Muslim country and is involved in
conducting combat operations. His unit is going to go out
on patrol the next day and he attacks his unit, killing some
Soldiers. The defense theory could be that members in the
unit continually joked that they were going to rape Muslim
women and pillage mosques while out on the patrol.
74 Id. at 107-08 (internal citations omitted).
" Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
76 Id.
" Id. at 108.
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Because of the accused's mental illness (delusional and
paranoid features), he is unable to understand that they were
joking and actually believed that they would do these things.
He already felt isolated and distrustful of members of the
unit, to include law enforcement personnel. He therefore
decided to take action against those members of his unit
before they do what he believed would be a terrible thing.
Further, he might have believed that he was the only person
who could stop this terrible thing from happening.
Based on that theory, the defense counsel could argue
that the accused was not able to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct. He might have known that the conduct was
illegal, but not have appreciated the wrongfulness of his
conduct because he had a mental illness that caused him to
believe that he was doing the morally right thing. He might
have even believed that society at large would be thankful
that he prevented this other (delusional) tragedy. The
defense counsel would recognize that she will still lose on
this theory, but maybe one or two panel members will have
some doubt about the accused's legal guilt (his mental
responsibility) and so not vote for death later in the
proceeding. And by pursuing this admission defense, the
defense is able to frontload mitigation into the guilt phase.
The panel members would see that the accused's reason for
committing the offense, while twisted, was not as awful as it
could have been. The panel members will see a fully-
developed case about the accused's mental health. The
panel members will hear about the accused's family history
and upbringing and how that shaped his mental health. The
panel members might further hear about how people in his
unit missed the signs of his deteriorating mental health.
Imprtantly, the panel will hear all of this during the merits.
Defense counsel can also argue for partial mental
responsibility as a fallback position from the defense of lack
of mental responsibility. The goal is to have at least one
panel member experience residual doubt about the accused's
legal guilt by casting the accused's intent in some way that is
different than that required by the capital offense, even if the
accused could appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of his acts.
Partial mental responsibility falls into two main
categories. The first is partial mental responsibility as a true
defense, whereby if the defendant proves to a sufficient
standard that he has the right degree of mental illness, then
the fact finder can reduce culpability from first-degree
murder to manslaughter, much like the way the defense of
heat of passion operates to reduce culpability from first-
degree murder to manslaughter.78  The second is partial
mental responsibility as an evidentiary rule, where evidence
of mental illness may be admitted to explain that the
defendant could not or did not form the specific intent that is
required for any specific intent crime. In some jurisdictions,
that evidence is admissible in any case; in some, that
evidence is admissible in murder cases only; in others, that
evidence is never admissible.7 9  The military uses partial
mental responsibility as an evidentiary rule. In the military,
the evidentiary rule is broad, as evidence of mental illness
may be admitted in any case to show that the accused could
not form the required intent,80 or to otherwise explain that he
formed some other intent than the one charged."
In a premeditated murder case, the defense counsel
might use mental health evidence to argue that the accused
could not premeditate. Note that "to premeditate" does not
equal "to plan." Premeditation requires more than just
planning to do the murder or thinking about it for some short
period of time before the act. The Court of Military Appeals
has described what thought process is required: "The
deliberation part of the crime requires a thought like, 'Wait,
what about the consequences? Well, I'll do it anyway."' 82
Look at the actual word premeditate and note the root:
meditate. The accused needs to meditate about the crime
before doing it. And, premeditation requires a cooling-off
period or "reflection by a cool mind."8 3 If someone is in
such a rage that he cannot meditate or consider the
consequences of his actions, then he did not premeditate.
Again, this is much like the heat-of-passion defense. If
someone catches his spouse in bed with another man and
then goes to the car, grabs a gun, and kills the adulterers,
then he has essentially not premeditated, even though he
hatched a short-lived plan to kill the adulterers. Society has
decided that because he acted in a rage, his culpability is
lower and so his crime is reduced to a lower form of
homicide. Once he has the time to cool off, the defense
becomes unavailable.
Many trial advocates, military judges, and appellate
judges tend to focus on whether an accused's mental health
problem made him unable to plan the murder.84 Yet an
accused's mental health problem, even if extraordinarily
severe, may not affect his ability to plan at all. People with
severe mental health problems may have no problem with
planning events. A paranoid schizophrenic could wake up
and plan to go to the grocery store, or plan to go to his
parents' house, or plan to go to the park. A person who is
fully psychotic, who believes that God is telling him to
murder his wife and children to save their souls, can still
' Id. § 26.02(B), at 369-73.
so MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 66, para. 6-5.
81 Id. para. 5-17.
82 United States v. Hoskins, 36 M.J. 343, 346 (C.M.A. 1993).
83 United States v. Viola, 26 M.J. 822, 829 (A.C.M.R. 1988); United States
v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 279 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
" See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 67 M.J. 514, 529-30 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. 2008); United States v. Dock, 26 M.J. 620, 629 (A.C.M.R. 1988) (De
Giulio, S.J., dissenting).
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plan the murders: he could write down what he plans to do,
then get a gun from a storage unit, load it, drive to his home,
walk through the door, and kill his family. Someone with a
severe mental disease or defect may fully satisfy the lack of
mental responsibility defense (be unable to appreciate the
nature and uality or wrongfulness of his acts) and still be
able to plan.
The issue is not the ability to plan, but the ability to
premeditate. Defense counsel should focus on how the
accused's mental illness impacts that accused's ability to
reflect with a cool mind or to meditate on the offense, not on
whether the accused could plan. For example, the defense
counsel might argue that because of the mental disease or
defect (for example, something that impacts impulse control
or executive functioning) the accused did not have the ability
to calm down and contemplate the impact of his actions
before he took them. If the accused becomes enraged and
because of his mental disorder stays enraged for the ten
minutes that it takes him to get his gun from the barracks
room and return to the day room to kill the victim, then he
has not reflected on the crime with a cool mind and so has
not premeditated. If his mental disorder prevented him from
thinking through the fallout or consequences of his act, then
he has not premeditated.
The mental health condition can also provide evidence
that the accused's intent was something other than what the
government charged. The accused's mental disorder may
provide the context for the panel member to see that he was
engaged in a "suicide by cop," where he was trying to set in
motion events that would lead to his death. He may have
shot at police officers fully knowing that he was likely to hit
and kill some of them, but because of his depression he may.
not have actually cared if he did kill any of them. In that
case, he would not have had the specific intent to kill
required for premeditated murder.86  Instead, a panel
member could vote to find him guilty of a lesser murder
charge, like wanton disregard murder, where the specific
intent required matches what he was thinking: "That the
accused knew that death or great bodily harm was a probable
consequence of the act."87
In both instances, if the defense counsel has presented a
complete case on the issue and has clearly made those
distinctions before the panel, then some of the panel
members may have a lingering doubt about the accused's
guilt on the capital offense. The panel members may still
85 See generally John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles in
Developing and Presenting Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases,
THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 63.
86 UCMJ art. 118(1) (2008); MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note
66, para, 3-43-1.
81 UCMJ art. 118(3) (2008); MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note
66, para. 3-43-3.
vote for guilt and be completely sure of factual guilt-but
may retain a lingering doubt about legal guilt.
Conclusion and Lessons for Non-Capital Practice
Using an admission defense in the ways described
above has many benefits for the defense counsel. The CJP
findings tell us that many jurors make up their minds about
life or death during the merits portion of trial-and even
actively negotiate those positions during the merits
deliberation. If a defense counsel uses an admission
defense, she has an opportunity to help shape the sentencing
negotiations that may be going on during the merits phase.
When presenting this mitigating mental health evidence, the
defense counsel's goal is to have a single panel member
agree with her and either hold on to that vote for not guilty,
or to negotiate off of that vote by committing to a vote for
life early in the process, perhaps even in the merits
deliberation.
Further, even if a panel member completely rejects the
defense theory on intent, that panel member might still
believe that the accused has reduced culpability when
compared to a murderer who does not have that impairment,
and this perception of reduced culpability is a known
mitigator. If the military or other agencies could have taken
action before the incident that may have prevented the
accused from murdering someone, such as providing him
mental health care or separating him from the military, then
the panel member might find that the military or another
agency shares some culpability, and this perception of
shared culpability is a known mitigator. Finally, if the
defense counsel brings in family members to testify on the
merits about how they observed the accused's mental health
or cognitive impairments throughout the accused's life, then
the defense counsel can frontload family member testimony
(a known mitigator) into the merits of the case while also
helping to prove that the underlying mental health or
cognitive problems exist.
Defense counsel should look at the merits phase and the
sentencing phase as one, and admission defenses allow
defense counsel to do this. Critically, if the defense counsel
or military prosecutor waits until the presentencing hearing
to put on sentencing evidence, she may have missed the
opportunity to persuade more than half of the panel members
with her mitigation (or aggravation) evidence because jurors
often make up their minds about punishment while still in
the merits phase of trial.
These broad lessons from the CJP can be applied to
non-capital military justice practice. From our discussion
above, we see that extenuation should be more powerful
than freestanding mitigation because this evidence directly
relates to the commission of the crime. If panel members
think that the accused's free will could not be fully exercised
or was overcome, then the panel members will be more
likely to accept that the environment played a role in the
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crime and find the accused is not as blameworthy as
someone who could fully exercise his free will.
However, many defense counsel focus on the
freestanding mitigating factors without connecting those
mitigators to the commission of the crime. Defense counsel
present the life problems of the accused, but might not show
the relationship between those problems and why the
accused committed the crime. Rather, defense counsel
should work to convert the freestanding classically
mitigating factors (e.g., that he grew up in a certain
environment) into connected extenuating factors by tying
them into the reasons why the accused committed the
offense. Classically mitigating factors that do not otherwise
address free will may not do much on their own. Defense
counsel should also concentrate on rebutting the proven
aggravators (fear, loathing, and lack of remorse) and
bolstering the proven mitigators (extenuation, reduced and
shared culpability, acceptance of responsibility, impact on
the family of the sentence, and evidence of "good" in the
accused).
Defense counsel should consider using the admission
defense much more often, and not just in capital cases. In
the military, defense counsel tend to be conservative with
guilty pleas. If a client has a mental health problem that
does not rise to the defense of lack of mental responsibility,
and if the client is facing a high likelihood of conviction,
then the defense counsel understandably tries to plead the
case. Under these circumstances, the mental health evidence
often becomes a liability for a guilty plea inquiry. The
defense counsel now becomes afraid that the military judge
will reject the plea because of the client's problem, or that
the military judge might reopen the plea inquiry if the
defense counsel introduces extenuating or mitigating
evidence during the presentencing proceeding that might
somehow raise the lack of mental responsibility defense. 8
Because of this, defense counsel often have the client
minimize these problems when going through the plea
inquiry with the military judge: "I was depressed, your
honor, but I could still form the intent to do the crime; I
meant to do the terrible thing I did; my depression played no
role in this crime."
When the defense counsel does that, she deflates what
would have been a great extenuation and mitigation case.
The defense case is now inconsistent-the defense has told
the judge that mental health problems had nothing to do with
anything, but now wants to come in during the presentencing
proceeding and say how extenuating and mitigating the
mental health problems are, if she even risks introducing the
evidence at all.
This is not the only option available to defense counsel.
Consider using an admission defense in an average case. Put
on the merits case and show where the client's actions were
caused by his mental illness. Overtly, the defense counsel
will argue lack of mental responsibility or partial mental
responsibility. In the background, the counsel knows she
will not win on the defense but hopes that the panel will
instinctively apply the irresistible impulse89 or product90
tests-both of which are intuitive and help to frame
mitigating evidence-during their deliberations on the
sentence. The defense may lose on the merits, but now has a
fully developed extenuation and mitigation case, and the
defense counsel does not have to worry about the judge
rejecting the plea inquiry. This strategy involves risk, but
may be the right strategy for certain clients. At the very
least, this discussion illustrates that by understanding the
CJP's findings, military justice practitioners can gain insight
and new perspectives on other areas of their practice.
88 This is an area that receives much attention from appellate courts. See
generally United States v. Riddle, 67 M.J. 335 (C.A.A.F. 2009); United
States v. Shaw, 64 M.J. 460 (C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Estes, 62
M.J. 544 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
89 Under the irresistible impulse test, the insanity defense can apply if the
defendant, because of a mental illness, had an impulse that he could not
overcome and so lost the ability to avoid doing the criminal act. See
generally DRESSLER, supra note 71, § 25.04(C)(2), at 353-54.
9 Under the product or Durham test, the insanity defense can apply if the
person's conduct was caused by, or was the product of, a mental illness.
See generally id § 25.04(C)(4), at 355-56.
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